Ko Jung-ae
The author is the editor-in-chief at the JoongAng Sunday.
A recent article by a fellow reporter covering the by-election in Incheon’s Yeonsu-A district included a striking line: “The 86 generation still believes only they can lead, operating within their own closed league. Yet they are not cultivating younger successors.” A few weeks earlier, a Democratic Party (DP) acquaintance in his 50s who has spent decades in the party put it more bluntly. “Look at them. In the end, it’s always the 86 generation. How many decades are they going to dominate politics?”
Song Young-gil, right, the Democratic Party candidate in the by-election for the National Assembly seat in Incheon’s Yeonsu-A district, delivers opening remarks during a Supreme Council meeting in Incheon on April 24. From left are party leader Jung Chung-rae, Incheon mayoral candidate Park Chan-dae and Song. [News1]
The “86 generation” refers to Koreans born in the 1960s who entered universities in the 1980s, participated in student and labor movements during the democratization era and later entered politics. Most are now in their late 50s to early 60s.
In “Democratic Party 1999–2024,” former Rep. Woo Sang-ho, once a Yonsei University student council president and one of the symbolic figures of the 86 generation, reflects on his generation’s political origins. He describes how the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement and the military rule of Chun Doo Hwan shaped their formative experiences. He also recounts how former student activists began preparing for political participation in 1999 through a group called “Korea’s Future, the Third Force.”
Woo lists dozens of participants by name, many of whom later became major political figures within the DP. They include Kim Kyung-soo, Kim Tae-nyeon, Song Young-gil, Ahn Hee-jung, Lee In-young, Lim Jong-seok, Jung Chung-rae and Cho Jung-sik, among many others. Another long list follows of politicians who rose through later parliamentary elections, including Kang Gi-jung, Park Beom-kye, Park Hong-keun, Yoon Ho-jung, Lee Kwang-jae, Chun Joon-ho and Hwang Hee.
Woo nevertheless argues that “the 86 generation as a group did not succeed.” He criticizes his generation for reinforcing factional politics within the DP and for failing to fight more thoroughly against inequality and social polarization. He also admits that the generation failed to speak out strongly enough when liberal administrations fell short of public expectations. The self-criticism appears partly inspired by comparisons with Germany’s more reformist and inclusive 1968 generation.
Yet looking through the long list of names, what stood out was less regret than power and pride.
In the actual game of acquiring, maintaining and expanding political power, the 86 generation has been overwhelmingly successful. Its members dominate in numbers and longevity. They have also survived repeated calls for retirement. The 2019 Cho Kuk scandal was one such moment of crisis, but the group defended itself aggressively. Woo once said he felt insulted by claims that the generation had become part of the political establishment. Former DP floor leader Park Hong-keun similarly argued, “Did we become party leader? Did we become president?”
But Woo’s own list suggests otherwise. The generation has produced party leaders, senior ministers and even potential National Assembly speakers such as Cho Jung-sik. Their influence arguably surpasses the old alliance of military academy graduates and elite bureaucrats that once drove Korea’s industrialization.
Part of this dominance stems from the collapse of the conservative camp itself. Former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law made the 86 generation’s old narrative of “democracy versus antidemocracy” sound persuasive again. Yet there is also a sophisticated internal structure of power sharing among them. Even when policy differences emerge, they act collectively to preserve influence.
That pattern appeared again in the June 3 election. Members of the 86 generation both distributed nominations and received them. When Woo decided to run for Gangwon governor, Lee Kwang-jae stepped aside. Lee was then rewarded with a National Assembly nomination of his own. Song Young-gil was also carefully accommodated when he risked being pushed aside by presidential aides. Differences were postponed in favor of preserving and expanding the group’s political influence.
The result is fewer new faces in politics. The acquaintance quoted earlier remarked that the group tends to promote only younger politicians who remain obedient.
If the 86 generation had truly evolved through self-reflection, perhaps new leadership would not be necessary. Yet its worldview often appears frozen in the logic of 30 years ago. Politics is still framed as a struggle between absolute allies and enemies, where opponents must be destroyed and allies are justified regardless of circumstance. Conservatives may be even more disorganized, but that alone does not make the old logic any less troubling.
다시 86, 다시 그 논리
고정애 중앙SUNDAY 편집국장
인천 연수갑을 다녀온 동료 기자의 글에서 다음 문장을 만났다. “86세대가 ‘나 아니면 안 된다’며 여전히 그들만의 리그를 펼치고 있다. 정작 후배 양성은 없다.” 몇 주 전, 민주당에서 잔뼈가 굵은 1970년대생 지인 A가 같은 얘기를 훨씬 격하게 했었다. “봐라. 결국 다 86이다. 몇십 년을 해먹는 거냐.”
연대 총학생회장 출신으로 86세대의 상징적 인물인 우상호가 여의도를 떠나며 낸 『민주당 1999~2024』엔 자신의 세대에 대한 설명이 담겼다. 5·18과 전두환 군부 통치가 형성적 경험이었고, 학생운동권 지도부 일부가 1999년부터 정치 진입을 준비해 ‘한국의 미래, 제3의 힘’을 꾸렸다는 내용이다.
참여자들의 이름도 굵은 고딕체로 나열했다. 대부분 쟁쟁해 길지만 인용한다. 기동민·김경수·김만수·김성환·김영배·김영춘·김우영·김원이·김윤식·김종민·김태년·김현·백원우·복기왕·서갑원·송갑석·송영길·신동근·안희정·오영식·우상호·유기홍·윤건영·이규희·이용선·이인영·이철우·이해식·이화영·임종석·정원오·정청래·조정식·최종윤 등 30여 명이다. 17~21대 총선 과정에서 등장한 이들도 있는데, 강기정·권칠승·김교흥·김윤덕·김의겸·박범계·박수현·박정·박홍근·백혜련·서영교·송기헌·신정훈·안민석·안호영·오기형·윤호중·이광재·이용우·전재수·정성호·정태호·조승래·진선미·진성준·천준호·최기상·한병도·허영·홍익표·황희 등이다(많이 생략했다).
우상호는 그러곤 “그룹으로서의 86세대는 성공하지 못했다”고 주장했다. “민주당 계파 질서에 기여한 점이 첫 번째 과오”이고 “불평등과 격차 해소라는 시대정신을 구현하기 위해 더 철저하게 싸우지 못한 점도 한계였다고 뼈아프게 반성한다”라거나 “여당 시절에 대통령과 청와대가 국민의 기대에 부응하지 못하고 있었을 때 제대로 목소리 내지 못했던 것도 부족한 점”이라고 했다. 독일을 더 개방·포용적으로 이끈 68세대와의 비교인 듯하다. 대부분 배지를 단 이름 하나하나를 보며 ‘과오’ ‘반성’ ‘부족’보단 세(勢)나 자부심이 읽혔다.
실제 권력의 획득·유지·확장 게임에서 86세대는 압도적이다. 머릿수도, 패권 기간도 그렇다. 여러 차례 퇴진론도 이겨냈다. 특히 2019년 조국 사태가 위기였는데 이들은 강하게 맞섰다. 우상호는 “우리가 무슨 자리를 놓고 정치 기득권화돼 있다고 말하는 것에 대해 약간 모욕감 같은 걸 느끼고 있었다”고 했고, 박홍근은 “우리가 당 대표를 했냐, 대통령을 했냐”고 했다.
하지만 우상호의 명단을 보라. 국회의장이 나오려 하고(조정식), 당 대표가 여럿이고(송영길·정청래), 장관은 지천이다. 산업화를 이끈 육사·엘리트관료 연합체를 능가한다. 물론 보수의 자멸 덕분일 거다. 윤석열 전 대통령의 계엄은 이들의 철 지난 ‘민주 대 반민주’ 주장을 그럴싸해 보이게 했다. 여기에다 이들만의 정교한 권력 담합 구조도 있다. 노선이 달라져도 패권 유지엔 유기체 같다. 이번 6·3 선거에도 86세대들이 공천을 했고, 또 공천을 받았다. 우상호가 강원지사로 나서자 이광재가 양보했고, 그런 이광재를 국회의원 후보로 공천했다. 대통령 참모에게 밀릴 듯하니 송영길을 따로 챙겼다. 서로 차이를 미루고, 파이를 키우는 길을 택했다. 놀라운 권력감이다. 대신 새 얼굴은 덜 보인다. 지인 A는 “말 잘 듣는 후배만 쓴다”고 했다.
86들이 반성 속에 진화했다면 새 인물이 굳이 필요 없을 수도 있겠다. 이들의 인식 틀은 그러나 30년 전에 고정된 듯하다. 세계관은 당시와 다를 바 없고, 적(敵)과 아(我)의 대결로 몰아가 전자는 절멸하려 들고 후자는 뭐든 정당하다고 주장하는 정치 행태도 여전하다. 공소취소 특검이 그렇고, 30년 전 주취 폭행을 두고 “5·18에 대한 이견 때문”이라고 눙치는 것도, 광화문광장에 6·25 기념물 설치는 불가하다는 태도도 그렇다. 구린데, 보수의 더한 한심함에 가려져 있을 뿐이다.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
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