Koh Yu-hwan
The author is an emeritus professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University and former director of the Institute for Unification Studies.
Summits involving the leaders of the United States, China and Russia were held in Beijing on May 14 and May 20 in rapid succession. The closely watched meetings among the world’s major powers reflected a broader shift in the international order, as the U.S.-led unipolar system gradually gives way to a more multipolar structure.
President Donald Trump participates in a welcome ceremony with China's President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People on May 14 in Beijing. [AP/YONHAP]
At the latest U.S.-China summit, Washington appeared focused on “managing relations” with Beijing while China concentrated on establishing what it called a “constructive strategic stability relationship.” Some diplomats even remarked that U.S. President Donald Trump appeared conciliatory while Chinese President Xi Jinping remained firm and confident throughout the talks.
During Trump’s first term, Washington attempted to “decouple” China from global supply chains as part of strategic competition. That effort later softened into “de-risking,” aimed at reducing vulnerabilities rather than severing ties altogether. The latest summit suggested another adjustment in Washington’s approach.
After returning to office and initially imposing sweeping tariffs on allies and rivals alike, Trump appeared to soften his stance during the Beijing visit. Accompanied by major business leaders including Jensen Huang and Elon Musk, Trump praised China and expressed hopes for expanded business cooperation in artificial intelligence, semiconductors and aerospace industries. Critics viewed the posture as unusually deferential for the leader of a global superpower.
The apparent shift reflected mounting domestic economic pressure. Rising prices linked to conflict with Iran have become a political burden ahead of November’s midterm elections, increasing pressure on the administration to stabilize relations with Beijing and avoid further disruption to supply chains and financial markets. As a result, Washington’s China strategy increasingly appears centered on managing competition rather than pursuing separation. The deep economic interdependence between the two countries has made a complete break unrealistic.
This process should be understood through the broader framework of “power transition.” Since Xi took power in 2012, China has promoted the “Chinese Dream,” calling for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” At the 2013 Sunnylands summit, Xi told then-President Barack Obama that “the Pacific Ocean is vast enough to accommodate both China and the United States.” At the 2023 San Francisco summit, Xi expanded the idea further, saying the Earth itself was large enough for both countries. During the latest summit, he went further still by openly demanding coexistence on equal terms.
From sharing the Pacific to sharing the globe, China’s message has steadily evolved into a demand for mutual recognition of spheres of influence. Beijing’s long-advocated concept of a “new type of major power relations” increasingly appears to be taking shape in reality.
The implications for Taiwan are particularly significant. Xi reportedly pressed Trump on whether the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of military conflict, but Trump avoided giving a direct answer. Instead, he suggested that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan could be reconsidered, implying that Taiwan might become a bargaining chip in negotiations with Beijing.
Whether this reflects a tactical retreat or a deeper strategic shift remains uncertain. Still, the message unsettled U.S. allies in Asia, including Korea and Japan, because it suggested Washington could revise security commitments if doing so served American interests. For countries that have long depended on the U.S. security umbrella, the remarks reinforced concerns that alliance commitments could become part of broader geopolitical bargaining.
Trump’s emphasis on transactional diplomacy also carries serious implications for Korea. While the United States is unlikely to alter its defense commitments to Taiwan or Korea immediately, the shift toward a multipolar order is becoming increasingly visible. Korea, therefore, needs to recognize the nature of this transformation and strengthen its own strategic autonomy while advancing national interests in the emerging AI era.
The China-Russia summit that followed became a platform for coordinated criticism of U.S. unilateralism. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing amid growing fatigue over the Trump administration’s tariff-driven trade confrontations. Unlike the U.S.-China summit, which failed to produce a joint statement, China and Russia issued a lengthy 47-page declaration criticizing sanctions and diplomatic isolation directed at North Korea.
In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping tour a photo exhibition on Russia-China ties in Beijing on May 20. [AFP/YONHAP]
The statement also emphasized expanded trilateral cooperation involving North Korea. One of its most notable elements involved plans for maritime access through the Tumen River in cooperation with Pyongyang. China has long sought direct access to the East Sea, while Russia has pursued broader strategic access to warm-water ports. Earlier regional development projects around the Tumen River stagnated after North Korea withdrew from the Greater Tumen Initiative in 2009. However, renewed efforts by China and Russia to pursue a trilateral maritime arrangement could strengthen coordination among the three countries and ease North Korea’s economic isolation.
The key point in such cooperation would likely be the development of Rajin Port. If maritime access through the Tumen River expands and a broader transnational economic cooperation zone emerges in Northeast Asia, the project could potentially contribute to regional prosperity and stability.
Before Trump’s Beijing trip, there had been speculation that another U.S.-North Korea summit might take place. However, Trump, having justified military action against Iran over nuclear concerns, would face accusations of applying double standards if he simultaneously pursued summit diplomacy with a nuclear-armed North Korea. For that reason, expectations for an early U.S.-North Korea summit remain limited.
China also faces constraints. Although Beijing is strengthening strategic cooperation with both North Korea and Russia, it may hesitate to become fully locked into a rigid new Cold War framework. That is why the timing of any possible visit by Xi to Pyongyang may depend heavily on developments surrounding the Iran conflict and broader geopolitical conditions.
Ultimately, neither Washington nor Beijing should approach North Korea solely through election politics or geopolitical rivalry. Rather than repeating ceremonial calls for denuclearization, the leaders of the United States and China should focus on concrete actions and political decisions aimed at ending the Korean War armistice system, which remains the world’s longest unresolved ceasefire.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
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