Ahn Byung-seok
The author is a special-appointed professor at Pyeongtaek University and former deputy commander of the Combined Forces Command.
For 34 years after graduating from the Korea Military Academy, I served as a soldier. I still remember watching dots move across monitors in an operations command center before dawn. A decision made moments faster could have saved lives. A delayed decision could result in danger. That is why emotion is not a strategy.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, left, walks with U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, second from right, to a meeting at the Pentagon in Washington on May 11. [MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA]
During the 2022 full operational capability evaluation for the transfer of wartime operational control (Opcon), I directed combined Korea-U.S. military exercises as the prospective commander of the future Combined Forces Command. That experience reinforced one lesson: Strategy does not work through declarations alone. It functions only when built on a prepared structure. Battlefields are not driven by slogans but by verified systems and connected capabilities.
Following the recent Korea-U.S. defense ministers’ meeting, debate over the transfer of Opcon has intensified again. The issue will shape the future defense structure of the Korean Peninsula, as well as the long-term framework of the alliance.
Opinions differ on timing, but the debate itself has begun from the wrong premise. The Opcon transfer is not solely about timing or conditions.
Arguments emphasizing timing place weight on political will, and those stressing the transfer’s conditions focus on military capability. In strategy, however, both create power. Capability without will becomes idle equipment. Will without capability is merely rhetoric. Strength emerges only when the two are combined.
The key question is not when Korea should reclaim Opcon but whether the transition can produce a defense structure stronger than the current one. The essence of the Opcon transfer is not simply recovering command authority; it is about establishing a new defense structure led by the Korean military. Command authority is only one component within that structure.
Structure means more than a command hierarchy. It includes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; command and control; strike and defense capabilities; logistics and maintenance; and Korea-U.S. interoperability. These elements must function organically as a single system. If even one axis weakens, delays spread across the structure — and any delay by itself is a risk.
Opportunities and dangers must be considered together. Korea today is not the Korea of the past. Its intelligence and surveillance capabilities have improved significantly, and the “three-axis system” has moved beyond rhetoric. If Korea-led command is combined with close interoperability with U.S. forces, deterrence could become even stronger.
Alliance modernization is not merely a U.S. demand. It is also necessary for Korea. At the latest defense ministers’ meeting, discussions focused less on the timing of the Opcon transfer and more on the future structure of combined defense.
In military affairs, excessive focus on speed often creates illusions. On actual battlefields, delayed decisions, supply problems and maintenance failures become critical weaknesses. Even a half-step delay can produce a crisis. That is why the standard for the Opcon transfer should not be speed but whether the structure can operate seamlessly without gaps.
If this principle is overlooked, defense capabilities could weaken even after command authority is transferred. A transition without a prepared structure creates dangerous vacuums. Conversely, once the structure is complete, the transfer itself follows naturally.
An F-16 fighter jet lands at Osan Air Base, a U.S. Forces Korea installation in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on Aug. 18, 2025, during the Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise. [NEWS1]
That is why conditions matter. Conditions are not obstacles designed to delay the transfer. They are the foundation for building a stronger defense structure. They include the capabilities Korea must secure, the areas the United States should continue supporting and the procedures and standards both sides must agree upon. Most important is a combined response system capable of operating automatically during emergencies.
The Opcon transfer is not a structure Korea can build alone. Without cooperation, there can be no stronger framework. If policymakers focus only on accelerating the timetable or formally satisfying conditions, the post-transfer system will inevitably become unstable.
Only one standard ultimately matters: Can Korea and the alliance make decisions faster and deter threats more effectively after the transfer than they can today? Without answering that question, prioritizing timing alone cannot be called a strategy.
The Opcon transfer is ultimately a necessary path. But it will not be completed through declarations alone. It will be achieved through the creation of a stronger defense structure. Soldiers do not fight based on emotion. Debate over the Opcon transfer must rest on strategy, not sentiment.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
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