A nomination process that seems designed to lose

Ko Jung-ae

The author is the editor-in-chief at the JoongAng Sunday.

Party nominations are always contentious, but on the conservative side in Korea they were especially turbulent in 2002 and 2008, when breakaway parties were hastily formed by defectors.

The 2000 nomination process under Lee Hoi-chang was often described as a “massacre.” Factional bosses were excluded, including Kim Yun-hwan and Lee Ki-taek. Kim, in particular, had been a political patron to Lee. In his memoir, “Lee Hoi-chang Memoirs” (2017), Lee wrote that he wrestled with whether his reform push was driven by personal motives or political necessity. The upheaval led to the formation of the Min Guk Party, and in early April that year, a surprise announcement was made of an inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang.

Lee Jung-hyun, chair of the People Power Party’s nomination committee, answers reporters’ questions as he arrives to attend a closed-door meeting at the party's headquarters in Yeongdeungpo District, Seoul, on March 15. Lee briefly stepped down from the post on March 13 before returning to the position the same day. [YONHAP]

Even in that environment, the Grand National Party, the predecessor of the People Power Party (PPP), maintained its status as the largest party. It had a clear justification in dismantling the era of the “three Kims” — Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil — and it was supported by a new generation of figures such as Oh Se-hoon, Won Hee-ryong, Kim Boo-kyum and Kim Young-choon. If the 1996 general election led by Kim Hyun-chul broadened conservative ideology with figures like Hong Joon-pyo, Lee Jae-oh and Kim Moon-soo, the 2000 election expanded its generational base with politicians distinct from the liberal “386 generation.”

The 2008 nominations, amid conflict between pro-Lee Myung-bak and pro-Park Geun-hye factions, were also labeled a “massacre,” though the situation differed in key respects. According to Kang Chang-hee, Park’s camp accepted the district nominations, albeit reluctantly. The main controversy arose over proportional representation nominations. Still, the Grand National Party secured a majority with 153 seats, while pro-Park groups, including the Pro-Park Alliance and independents, performed strongly. Discontent with the Roh Moo-hyun administration drew talent toward the conservative bloc.

If nominations are understood as a process of elite recruitment, this period marked the last time the conservative party functioned effectively. At best, that assessment extends to 2012, when both conservative and liberal camps mobilized fully. Political consultant Park Sung-min has said that nominations were “reasonably acceptable” from 1996 to 2012, but deteriorated thereafter.

By 2016, former President Park Geun-hye’s approach had narrowed further. While Lee Myung-bak and Park had at least demonstrated leadership, those who followed fell short. As conservatives became a minority across regions, generations, ideology and class, party figures remained complacent as if still dominant. Kim Hyong-o, who chaired the nomination committee in 2020, said in a recent interview that “there were hardly any capable candidates recommended by the party,” adding that the situation is likely worse now. His own tenure drew criticism for early purges followed by last-minute substitutions.

Conditions have since deteriorated further. Repeated electoral defeats have weakened recruitment in the Seoul metropolitan area, allowing figures disconnected from public sentiment to dominate the party. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party has grown more adept at elections, while the PPP has struggled.

Song Eon-seog, floor leader of the People Power Party, delivers opening remarks at a party strategy meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul on March 24. [YONHAP]

Despite the need for an extraordinary approach, the leadership, including nomination committee chair Lee Jung-hyun, continues to emphasize “reform” and “renewal” without presenting a clear framework. Critics argue that symbolic gestures and vague rhetoric cannot overcome strong presidential approval ratings and wide gaps in party support.

Vacancies created by cutoffs risk being filled by election denialists or hardline loyalists advocating a return to former President Yoon Suk Yeol. The late former lawmaker Chung Doo-un once remarked that raising turnover rates alone does not constitute reform if it merely replaces one inadequate candidate with another.

Now, even that standard appears unmet. The PPP increasingly looks as if it is preparing to lose. For veteran politicians who have experienced every facet of political struggle to express such concerns underscores how deeply the party’s weaknesses have taken root.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.