John Everad
The author is a former British ambassador to North Korea.
For decades, one of the most striking characteristics of North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has been its exaggerated rhetoric: utterly improbable stories about its god-king leaders and their astonishing achievements, and wildly extravagant claims of domestic well-being and prosperity. It was, it claimed, a society with nothing to envy. Ordinary DPRK citizens knew grimly that this was not true, but the regime myths, enshrined in the DPRK constitution, continued.
However, the revisions to the DPRK constitution approved by the Supreme People’s Assembly on March 22 and 23 took a major step toward dismantling this rhetoric. Formal changes to the country’s relationship with South Korea were widely expected because North Korean leader Kim Jong-un had announced them in December 2023. Indeed, Article 9 of the former constitution, which committed the DPRK to striving for peaceful reunification, was removed so that the constitution recognizes the fact that the Korean Peninsula is divided into two states. But we can now see that this change was just one aspect of a wide-ranging effort to bring the DPRK’s constitution more closely into line with reality.
Participants of the event commemorating the 11th Congress of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League of North Korea use torches to form the words “Kim Jong-un Youth League” and the Workers’ Party emblem in Pyongyang on April 30 in this screen capture from the Korean Central News Agency website. [YONHAP]
So, at last, the revised constitution recognizes that the DPRK’s huge welfare ambitions for its people no longer bear any relation to real life. They have been quietly abandoned — the very word “socialist” has been dropped from the title of the constitution. For example, it has been a long time since the constitution’s former claim that DPRK citizens “did not know unemployment” (Article 27) meant anything in practice. In fact, for many decades, many, even those with a formal job in state structures, have had to work in the DPRK’s burgeoning private sector — and in particular in its free markets — in order to make ends meet.
The newly revised constitution drops that claim. Similarly, the DPRK’s state health care sector has long been dysfunctional. Although competent nursing is often available, medicines have long been in short supply and often unobtainable (when I traveled from Pyongyang to Beijing, my DPRK friends would always ask me to bring medicines back). Conditions for surgery are frighteningly bad. The revised constitution drops claims to provide free universal health care. Also, although the regime has long implicitly recognized the DPRK’s acute housing shortage — leadership speeches often refer to the need to build more accommodations — the state remained constitutionally committed to providing housing (Articles 22 and 25). But that commitment, too, has been dropped. (On the other hand, the state’s obligation to provide free education — which, by and large, it does — remains in the constitution.)
More striking still are the changes to the regime’s claims to legitimacy. The revised constitution deletes the previous extensive references to the almost supernatural feats of the ancestors of Kim and refers to him no longer as “supreme leader” but simply as “head of state,” stating that this status derives from his position as chairman of the State Affairs Commission.
Since its foundation, one of the most striking characteristics of the DPRK has been its extraordinary political mythmaking and claims to legitimacy by its leaders — not by reference to a modern political process but through heredity in the Paektu bloodline, a system more associated with traditional monarchies than modern states.
The General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, affiliated with the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, holds its ninth congress in Pyongyang on May 11 and 12. [RODONG SINMUN]
The supreme leader was, in effect, a modern version of the old kings of Korea. But the term “head of state” is widely used and recognized in many modern states. The change means that the leader of the DPRK now derives their legitimacy not from their ancestry but from a formal position. This is a very significant political modernization.
These changes have numerous major implications.
Firstly, they have major implications for society. The immense gap between the inflated claims of the regime to look after its people and the reality that they see around them was a recipe for disillusionment and alienation, and the removal of these claims from the constitution eliminates a corrosive lie. Also, this change means that North Koreans can now discuss their problems in finding jobs, health care or housing without committing treason. This modest step toward openness may help in finding solutions.
There has already been internal discussion in the DPRK about setting up a health insurance system. The elimination of the constitutional obligation to provide free health care is likely to encourage this development. And will the withdrawal of the state’s obligation to provide employment, an implicit recognition of employment outside the state structures, lead to the creation of something like a normal job market, with positions and salaries advertised? Will it, too, lead the DPRK formally to introduce a tax system? Tellingly, the claim in Article 22 of the constitution, that the DPRK levies no tax, has been deleted.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and his daughter, Ju-ae, visit an instrument store preparing to open in the fourth-stage area of the Hwasong district in Pyongyang in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency on April 3. [YONHAP]
Secondly, the move away from legitimacy derived from the Paektu bloodline has important implications for the future of the leadership. On the one hand, it makes it easier for Kim to be succeeded by a woman — that is, by his daughter. A female successor would jar with the all-male myth of the heroic bloodline. In North Korea, mountains shook at the birth of founder Kim Il Sung, but they simply do not shake at the birth of a mere girl. But there is no reason a woman should not be appointed as chairman of the State Affairs Commission and so become head of state and exercise her power and legitimacy from that position.
On the other hand, it exposes Kim Jong-un’s family to possible challenges from outside. Why shouldn’t someone outside the royal clan be appointed to the top position? To head off such a threat, it would be important to establish the Kim family’s chosen successor as early and firmly as possible, which would largely explain the years of exposure of Kim Jong-un’s young daughter.
And now that the royal ancestors have been all but removed from the constitution, what will become of the symbols and rituals associated with them? For how much longer will DPRK schoolchildren still be taught the myths of Kim Il Sung’s birth and upbringing in Mangyongdae? Will the colorful models of his birthplace on show in most schools eventually be locked away and the lessons about him replaced in the timetable by more useful studies? And will the DPRK still invite visitors to the obviously fake hut on the slopes of Mount Paektu (guarded by glamorous woman soldiers in fur-trimmed uniforms), where it falsely claims Kim Jong-il was born, or will the hut slowly be abandoned and allowed to rot?
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's daughter Kim Ju-ae aims at a target with a sniper rifle at a firing range on Feb. 27 in this screen grab from the North's official Korean Central Television released on the following day. [YONHAP]
This formal abandonment of unbelievable myths and unfulfillable commitments will not turn the DPRK into a normal country overnight, but it is an important part of a long-term transition. If this process continues, it is possible to envisage a DPRK that eventually looks more like a “normal” dictatorship — perhaps similar to Gaddafi’s Libya or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq — where the state demands utter loyalty to the leader and viciously punishes criticism of him and demands that citizens believe he is a genius, but otherwise allows them much more scope to run their lives than does the present DPRK. This change would not necessarily make the DPRK easier for us outsiders to deal with, but it might make it rather more familiar.
But perhaps, just perhaps, we might come to miss the more colorful DPRK claims and wonder whether Kim Jong-il really did score a hole in one every time he played golf.
북한 헌법에서 ‘사회주의’가 사라진 이유
존 에버라드 전 평양 주재 영국대사
북한은 이제 ‘덜 이상한’ 나라로 향하고 있는가. 수십 년간 북한의 상징은 과장된 수사(rhetoric)였다. 지도자에 대한 신격화와 ‘세상에 부러움 없다’고 선전해온 국가 복지와 번영에 대한 기대는 체제를 유지하는 근간이었다. 주민들은 그것이 거짓임을 알았지만, 신화는 헌법에 명시된 채 굳건히 유지돼 왔다.
그러나 지난 3월 최고인민회의(국회 격)에서 개정한 헌법은 이러한 수사들을 대대적으로 수술했다. 김정은 국무위원장이 적대적 두 국가론을 내세우며 예고한 영토조항 말고도 개정 헌법엔 현실을 반영하려는 노력이 담겨 있다.
개정 헌법은 북한의 거창한 복지 야망이 현실과 괴리돼 있다는 점을 인정했다. 헌법 명칭에서도 ‘사회주의’라는 단어가 사라진 게 상징적이다. 기존 헌법의 “실업을 모르는”(29조)이라는 내용을 이번에 삭제했지만 이미 오래 전에 유명무실해졌다. 직장이 있는 이들조차 생계를 위해 장마당 같은 사적 영역에서 일해야 했던 현실을 개정 헌법에 반영한 것이다.
무상의료와 국가의 주택 제공도 마찬가지다. 약품은 늘 부족했고 수술 환경은 처참했다. 필자가 평양에서 베이징으로 갈 때마다 북한 지인들이 의약품을 부탁한 일은 흔한 풍경이었다. 결국 개정 헌법은 무상 치료와 국가 주택 제공 약속을 폐기했다.
더 놀라운 건 체제 정당성의 변화다. 개정 헌법은 선대들의 초자연적 업적에 대한 언급을 대거 삭제했다. 또한 김정은 위원장을 ‘최고영도자’가 아닌 ‘국가수반’으로 지칭하며, 그 지위를 국무위원장이라 규정했다. 북한은 건국 이래 ‘백두혈통’이라는 전근대적 세습 자산에 기대 정당성을 주장해 왔다. ‘최고영도자’가 조선 국왕의 현대판이었다면, ‘국가수반’은 현대 국가에서 널리 쓰이는 용어다. 이는 지도자의 권위가 혈통이 아닌 공식 시스템에서 나온다는 정치적 현대화를 의미한다. 북한이 민족 최대의 명절이라며 김일성 생일을 지칭했던 ‘태양절’이라는 용어 사용을 줄이고 선대 추모 행사에 김 위원장이 불참하는 등 선대를 배경으로 밀어내는 징후들도 포착되고 있다.
이러한 변화는 사회적으로 큰 함의를 갖는다. 체제의 비현실적 주장과 비참한 현실 사이의 간극이 줄어들면 주민들의 소외감이 다소 해소될 수 있다. 이제 북한 주민들은 직업이나 의료 문제를 이야기해도 ‘반역’이 되지 않는 환경이 됐다. 국가의 고용 및 무상 치료 의무가 사라진 자리에 건강보험 체계나 정상적인 노동 시장이 형성될 가능성도 엿보인다. 헌법에서 ‘무세금 국가’라는 조항을 삭제한 건 향후 공식적인 조세 제도 도입을 시사한다.
무엇보다 헌법 개정은 정치적으로 후계 구도에도 영향을 줄 수 있다. 혈통 중심의 권위가 옅어지면 딸(김주애)에게 권력을 승계하는 것이 한결 용이해진다. 남성 중심의 백두혈통 신화 속에서 여성 후계자는 이질적이었다. 하지만 공식 직함인 국무위원장 자격으로 ‘국가수반’이 되는 것이라면 여성이라는 이유로 후계자 자격에서 제외할 수 없기 때문이다. 물론 이는 왕조 밖의 인물이 권력에 도전할 명분을 줄 수도 있는 ‘양날의 검’이기도 하다. 김 위원장이 딸을 일찍 대중에 노출하고 개헌을 통해 국무위원장의 법적 지위를 강화한 것은 이러한 위협에 대비한 방어막으로 해석된다.
북한이 허황된 신화와 불가능한 약속을 공식적으로 포기한다고 해서 하룻밤 사이에 정상 국가가 되지는 않는다. 하지만 이는 중요한 변화의 분기점이라는 사실을 부인할 수 없다. 북한이 이런 변화를 이어 간다면 카다피의 리비아나 사담 후세인의 이라크 같은 ‘정상적인 독재국가’의 모습에 가까워질 것이다. 지도자에 대한 절대 충성을 요구하고 비판을 가혹하게 처벌하지만, 그 외의 일상 영역에서는 주민들에게 훨씬 더 많은 자율권을 부여하는 국가 말이다.
북한의 최근 변화만으로 외부 세계의 접근성을 높이지는 못할 것이다. 하지만 적어도 우리에게 조금 더 ‘익숙한’ 국가의 형태가 될 수는 있다. 물론 가끔은 북한의 그 화려하고 황당했던 주장들이 그리워질지도 모른다. 예컨대 김정일이 골프를 칠 때마다 홀 인원을 했다는 식의 그 기이한 이야기들 말이다.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
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